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Does Government Funding Change Behavior?
An Empirical Analysis of Crowd‐Out
A. Abigail Payne, McMaster University
Executive Summary
When governments introduce programs or funding for initiatives that are par-
tially provided by lower levels of governments or in the private or third sectors,
should the government be concerned about whether its efforts are crowded out
by changes in behavior by individuals and institutions participating in the pro-
vision of this good or service? The bulk of the theoretical literature suggests that
crowd‐out is an issue. The (historic) bulk of the empirical literature, however,
has failed to find a measurable crowd‐out effect. With better data and more
sophisticated empirical techniques, there is a burgeoning literature that shows
that crowd‐out exists. The purpose of this paper is to examine the recent litera-
ture that studies the issue of crowd‐out across a variety of venues to under-
stand better the empirical estimation issues as well as the institutional details
that can lead to a better understanding of the effects of government programs
on individuals and organizations.
I. Introduction
In many instances, government funding of goods and services is de-
signed to address issues associated with an underprovision of that good
or service by the private sector. The reasons for this underprovision in-
clude such things as individuals not recognizing the value of benefits
that extend beyond themselves (positive externalities), a good or service
that is used by many people (e.g., a park), and incomplete markets (e.g.,
insurance). Regardless of the underlying reason for the government
funding, the goal is usually to increase the provision of the good or ser-
vice being provided. Does the government meet this goal? Economic
theory often predicts that as the government steps in, the private fund-
ing declines. Sometimes the theory predicts that for every dollar of
government funding, private funding declines by that entire dollar.
Sometimes the theory predicts that crowd‐out is not complete: private
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978‐0‐226‐07654‐6/2009/2009‐0005$10.00funding declines by less than a dollar. The phenomenon of the govern-
ment funding undoing the private support is commonly referred to as
“crowd‐out.”
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The theoretical prediction of crowd‐out covers many topics. Some-
times we seek to understand whether the government funding crowds
out private funding. Examples of the types of goods and services for
which government funding may displace private funding include
charitable goods, artistic and cultural goods, health insurance, safety,
and education. Sometimes we are concerned with how two layers of
government interact, often seeking to understand whether federal
funding support of state or local goods results in fiscal substitution
by the lower‐level government. Examples of the types of goods and ser-
vices for which there may be direct benefits to a local community as
well as benefits that extend beyond the area covered by the local gov-
ernment are roads, education, and environment conservation.
Verifying the theoretical predictions empirically is an important step
for understanding how best to minimize these crowd‐out effects. If gov-
ernment provision is important to provide an optimal level of the good
orservice,thenpolicymakersneedtounderstandbetterthemechanisms
for crowd‐out. Unfortunately, empirically testing these predictions is
complicated. There are issues associated with the types and quality of
datawecangatherforthesetestsandstatistical issuesthataffecttheabil-
ity to obtain an unbiased estimate of crowd‐out. It is also important to
identifythegovernmentalinstitutionsandtheenvironmentunderwhich
the good or service is being provided to understand better how the
expected crowd‐out varies from the theoretical prediction.
Across the many types of goods and services for which we expect to
observe crowd‐out, researchers face similar empirical issues. Yet, it is all
too common to rely only on previous research that has a direct bearing
on the immediate question, ignoring lessons that have been learned in
themanyareasinwhichthecrowd‐outhypothesisistested.Thepurpose
of this paper is to explore what we have learned about the empirical es-
timation of crowd‐out across the many strands of public economics in
which this question has been studied. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to review all work that has been written on crowd‐out. I focus on the
analysis that has been conducted that has advanced our understand-
ing of the issues that must be addressed when seeking to estimate the
crowd‐out effect.
My focus is on three types of crowd‐out analysis. First, I explore the
research that measures the effect of federal funding on state and local
government expenditures. Much of the early empirical work suggested
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research suggests that the flypaper effect is attributable to an identifica-
tion issue in the statistical analysis. In the instances in which we still
observe the flypaper effect, there are institutional constraints on the
lower level of government provision that explain a failure to observe
crowd‐out.
Second, I explore the research that measures the effect of government
grants on private donations to charitable and religious organizations.
Most of the early empirical work measured no crowd‐out effect. Cur-
rent research uses panel data that allow one to control for differences
across charities and to create a better match between government fund-
ing and private donations. This newer research suggests that crowd‐out
is quite significant. There is, however, more to the story than just a re-
lationship between private donors and government funding. There are
institutional features that suggest that part of this crowd‐out is attribut-
able to the institutions that deliver the charitable goods and services.
Third, I explore the research that is focused on understanding how
individuals change their behavior when the government steps in to pro-
vide a privately consumed good for which the individual may not have
a strong preference or the financial means but for which there are
strong reasons to provide public support. Although there are several
types of goods that fall under this category, I focus on the research that
has studied the relationship between public and private health insur-
ance coverage. With the right identification strategy there is a significant
amount of crowd‐out. Themorestriking result, however,is the relatively
low take‐up rate of the public insurance program. The research in this
areaalsohighlightstheimportanceofconsideringthemannerofthepub-
lic provision and how the difference in quality between the public and
private goods affects the take‐up rate and the level of crowd‐out.
Across all strands of the literature, empirically identifying a negative
effect has been difficult. Recent work suggests that there are several key
issues we should consider when trying to assess whether crowd‐out
exists. It is important to carefully consider issues associated with the
empirical specification and the quality of the data that are used for
the analysis. Are there measures that are correlated with the public
funding and the dependent variable that are difficult to measure but
could bias the results? In addition, we should undertake to understand
whether a change in government funding is exogenous. Government
funding that is tied to politics or other aspects that also directly affect
voter sentiment suggests that government funding is endogenous. A
good statistical analysis will control for this endogeneity. A failure to
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government funding on the dependent variable, resulting in drawing
misleading conclusions.
We must also pay careful attention to the institutional environment
under which the government program operates. The theoretical frame-
work tends to be general with respect to institutional detail. Different
settings, however, can affect whether we observe crowd‐out and the at-
tribution of the crowd‐out to different players. For example, if publicly
provided and privately provided goods are not perfect substitutes, it is
important to consider how this could affect the relationship between
the two sources of goods/funding. Similarly, if individuals are latent
in their actions or if there are special features of the institutions that
provide the publicly supported good, there may be other actors in-
volved that can affect the crowd‐out that is measured.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II explores the statistical issues
associated with identifying crowd‐out and illustrates how researchers
have addressed these issues across the three examples. Section III illus-
trates the importance of considering the institutional framework under
which the government funding operates. Section IV provides a synthesis
of the research discussed and a conclusion.
II. Empirical Context for Crowd‐Out and Examples
A. Empirical Context
Across the different examples, the theoretical motivation for expecting a
negative relationship between government funding and the dependent
variable varies. These variations are discussed below. The empirical is-
sues, however, are similar. The basic setup is to estimate the following
equation:
Yit ¼ α þ βGovtit þ Exogitδ þ εit;
where Y is the dependent variable (e.g., state/local funding, private do-
nations, private spending), Govt is the measure of government funding,
Exog is a set of exogenous measures that help to identify variations in Y,
and εis an error term. The subscript iidentifies the unit of observation (e.g.,
individual, state or locality, charitable organization), and the subscript t
identifies the period the measure covers (e.g., year). The data can be
cross‐sectional and cover a single period. Most of the current research
uses data with repeated observations for a set of units, allowing the re-
searchertoobservedifferencesacrosstheunitsaswellaswithintheunits.
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data set), one can control for unobserved heterogeneity across the cross
sectionthroughafixed‐effectsestimation.Underafixed‐effectsspecifica-
tion, the constant term, α, contains a subscript i since the estimation
includes a set of dummy variables that equal zero or one to identify
time‐invariant characteristics of the cross‐sectional units. For example,
if the cross‐sectional unit is a state, the set of dummy variables equals
the number of states under analysis. Each variable represents a single
state, with the value of the variable equaling one for the observations
for that state and zero for the observations for the other states. These
dummy variables control for such things as size, geographic location,
and time‐invariant ideological perspectives of each state. If the cross‐
sectional unit is a charity, the dummy variable controls for such things
as mission type, size, and time‐invariant characteristics of the area in
which the charity is located. These dummy variables help to control for
expected differences between the dependent variable and the level of
government funding across the units.
Crowd‐outismeasuredbythecoefficientonthegovernmentmeasure,
β. Under ideal circumstances, this coefficient is unbiased, representing a
statistically accurate measurement of the average effect from a change in
government funding on the dependent variable. Most of the studies that
seek to measure crowd‐out rely on observational data derived from sec-
ondary sources. Nichols (2007) provides a synthesis of issues researchers
face when using observational data for statistical analysis. In the context
of crowd‐out, there are numerous studies that suggest that we should be
concerned about an upward bias (more positive) in the estimation of β.
The estimate of β can be biased because of endogeneity of the govern-
ment funding measure and/oromitted variablesthat arecorrelatedwith
the measure of government funding. The government funding measure
is endogenous if there is a process by which the dependent variable and
the governmentfunding arejointlydetermined. Acommon sourceofen-
dogeneity is attributable to the political process. Ultimately bureaucrats
and politicians are responsible to the electorate. The mechanism for this
responsibility is complicated. Baron and Ferejohn (1987, 1989), Besley
and Case (2000), and Besley and Coate (2003) illustrate how the election
process can affect bureaucratic and political decisions, resulting in gov-
ernment funding that is linked to political representation. If the depen-
dent variable reflects voter preferences for the provision of the good or
service in question, then we should be concerned about endogeneity of
the government measureif the allocation of the government expenditure
also reflects voter preferences.
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interests could translate into both giving to charities that help the poor
and electing politicians who suppo r tg o v e r n m e n tp r o g r a m st h a ta r e
focused on the poor. It is fairly common to observe government and
charitable goods aimed at alleviating poverty in areas with high poverty
levels. Thus, across units of observations (e.g., neighborhoods) we
should expect to observe neighborhoods with high and low levels of
funding. A cross‐sectional analysis of these neighborhoods would most
likely result in a crowding‐in effect. Similarly, within neighborhoods, if
there is an increase in need, it would also be common to observe an in-
crease in both private and public funding. From both a cross‐sectional
and within‐unit perspective, it is important to control for these joint cor-
relations. Otherwise, a statistical analysis could result in estimating a β
that is positive or less than the predicted crowd‐out. If the two types of
funding are tied to the political process (via voter sentiment), however, a
finding of no or smaller crowd‐out would be fallacious.
A related but slightly different issue concerns potential omitted‐
variable bias. This type of bias results from the limited information re-
searchers use for their analyses. In the equation above, the error term, ε,
contains measures that affect the dependent variable that a researcher
cannot easily observe. For example, it might be a dramatic event that
would cause an increase (or decrease) in the flows of the dependent
variable. If these omitted measures affect only the dependent variable
and have no direct bearing on the government measure, the estimate of
β is unbiased. If, however, this dramatic event also affects government
funding, then excluding this measure from the estimation results in β
being biased. An example might be a natural disaster that causes seri-
ous damage to the roads in a state. This damage would likely result in
an increase in both state and federal funding to rebuild the roads. If this
event is not observable to the researcher, the measure that would capture
this event is in the error term. Another example of an omitted‐variable
bias is a case in which the researcher has incorrectly specified the rela-
tionship between the dependent variable and the government funding
measure. In the example above, a linear relationship is assumed. If,
however, the relationship is not a straight line, for example, the relation-
ship has a curvature, then the exclusion of a higher‐order term (e.g.,
government funding squared) would bias β as well.
The issues of endogeneity and omitted‐variable bias can be addressed
by using measures or events that allow for the identification of the exog-
enous part of government funding. The prominent statistical strategies
are two‐stage least squares (2SLS), a difference‐in‐difference or natural
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to identify a set of measures (called instruments) that directly explain
government funding but only indirectly affect the dependent variable.
Government funding is predicted using these instruments (first‐stage
estimation), and then the predicted government funding is used to mea-
sure the crowd‐out effect on the dependent variable (second‐stage esti-
mation). Political variables that capture control, seniority, or some other
aspect of political power are a common set of measures. The expectation
is that political party affiliation and more general characteristics of voter
sentiment affect both government funding and the private provision of
ordemandforthegoodorserviceunderstudy.Measuresthatreflectsuch
thingsasseniorityinCongressormembershiponcongressionalcommit-
tees capture aspects of government funding that may not be directly tied
to the dependent variable. These latter measures may be used to predict
the exogenous aspects of government funding.
To be effective, the instruments must strongly predict government
funding. A researcher should report the f‐statistic for the significance
of the instruments in predicting government funding in the first‐stage
analysis. A high f‐statistic suggests a strong relationship between the
instruments and the government funding. In addition, the instruments
should not have a direct effect on the dependent variable. Ensuring this
is more difficult. There are statistical tests that should be reported that
test the sensitivity of the inclusion of the instruments in the second‐stage
estimation.Partofwhatmakesameasureagoodinstrument,however,is
a convincing story of why it is a good instrument.
The idea behind a natural experiment is that there is a major unex-
pected change that affects public funding. An example of such a natural
experiment might be an event that causes voter sentiment to change. For
example, in the 1990s there was a vocal reaction to government‐funded
art exhibitions by the Republican Party around the time the Republican
Party took control of Congress. It would be difficult to attribute the po-
litical turnover in Congress to the government funding of art. A conse-
quence of the change in government was that overall funding to art
organizations declined after this political change. Thus, one can treat
the change in political leadership as a natural experiment and treat the
changeingovernmentfundingasexogenous.Thisallowsonetomeasure
crowd‐outonthebasistheeffectfromthechangeingovernmentfunding
to arts organizations between the year before and the year after the turn-
over on private donations to these organizations.
A more elaborate way to exploit a natural experiment is to use a
difference‐in‐difference technique. In this technique, there is an unexpected
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other. Ideally one can use data that contain observations for before
and after the change for both groups. The group of observations that
is not affected by the change is considered a “control” group and the
group that is affected by the change is considered a “treatment” group.
The observations for the control group are used to control for variations
in the dependent variable that affect both the treatment and control
groups. Under this type of analysis, the crowd‐out measured for the
treatment group is considered exogenous.
2
Regression discontinuity is a variation in the development of instru-
ments under a 2SLS type of estimation. Under regression discontinuity,
the researcher observes a discontinuity in the treatment of different
groups that is attributable to something exogenous such as a rule.
The cleanest discontinuity exists if there is a rule with a specific but
somewhat arbitrary cutoff. Providing funding under a program for chil-
dren born after 1990 but not for those children born earlier is such an
example. There are also examples of discontinuities that change aspects
of the rules. For example, if the government funding is distributed
through a formula, there may be aspects of the formula that change dis-
continuously. As illustrated below, the formula used for federal educa-
tion funding is based on historical data on poverty. Just prior to the
release of census data, the formula uses a poverty measure that is ap-
proximately 10 years old. If the poverty level has changed during those
10 years, on the release of new census data, we should expect the gov-
ernment funding to increase or decrease, in the direction of the change
in poverty levels. This discrete change is unexpected and can be used to
identify an exogenous variation in government funding.
There is no simple formula one can follow to identify an exogenous
variation in government funding. The techniques discussed above have
their strengths and weaknesses. Overall, a good analysis discusses the
potential weakness of the approach taken and provides a justification
for why the reader should believe that the analysis is accurately mea-
suring the crowd‐out effect from government funding.
B. Do Federal Block Grants Crowd Out State and Local Spending?
Over the last century, the federal government has become increasingly
involved in funding state and local government‐provided goods and
services. The nature of the federal grants ranges from open‐ended to
capped grants for designated categories and/or programs that broadly
support a variety of programs. Gramlich and Galper (1973) point out
Payne 166that the effects of federal grants on state/local governments depend,
in part, on the form of grant. The discussion of crowd‐out is limited to
analyses that focus on block or categorical grants. Bradford and Oates
(1971) suggest that if a block grant is fungible, some or all of this fund-
ing results in the state/local government returning funds to its taxpayers.
Y e tm o s to ft h ee m p i r i c a ls t u d i e s ,e v e nar e c e n ts t u d yb yE v a n sa n d
Owens (2007), find that an increase in funding by the federal govern-
ment results in an increase in the total expenditures of the recipient state
or local government.
Bradford and Oates (1971) use a model that assumes that the lower
level of government is satisfying the preferences of the representative
voter, given budget constraints. A grant from the federal government
causes the state/local government’s budget to increase. An increase
in the budget should result in an increase in the overall spending on
the good for which the federal funding is targeted (called an “income
effect”). Because the state/local funding for the targeted good already
maximizes local voter preferences, the local funding should also decline
since the federal funds can be used as a substitute for the local funding,
resulting in a decrease in the amount of taxes collected by the state/
local government. Hines and Thaler (1995) estimate that spending
should rise by only about 5%–1 0 %f r o mt h ei n c o m ee f f e c t .T h eb u l k
of the change in state/local funding should be seen through the substi-
tution effect.
The types of data used to measure the effect of federal funding on
state or local expenditures are similar across most papers. Researchers
rely on government‐level data on spending and revenue. Given that we
expect to observe the substitution effect through a reduction in the pay-
ment of state or local taxes, research could be improved if information
on individual incomes and taxes paidwerelinked to government spend-
ing. As pointed out by Hines and Thaler (1995), if voter preferences are
not accurately captured in government‐level data, the crowd‐out esti-
mate is biased because of misspecification error. The bigger issue in this
area of research, however, is endogeneity. These studies concern two or
more levels of government funding, and each level is responsible to its
electorate. Thus, it is reasonable to be concerned about the funding for
each level to be tied to voter sentiment.
Knight (2002) studies the effect of federal highway funding on state
spending. Knight frames the endogeneity issue by considering the bar-
gaining that occurs within a congressional committee when there are
states with differing needs for highway funding. While most of the fed-
eral highway funding is allocated under a formula, Knight provides
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politicalconsiderations.Heusesasetofinstrumentsthatreflectmember-
ship, party affiliation, and tenure on the transportation committee. His
results demonstrate that if one ignores the issue of endogeneity, one
would erroneously conclude that an increase in federal funding results
in an increase in state funding. After controlling for the endogeneity of
the government grants, the estimates suggest that the federal grants
crowd out state spending, by a range of $0.88–$1.12 per dollar of federal
funding.
Gordon (2004) examines the effects of the Title I program for education—
a significant initiative by the federal government to support elementary
and secondary education. Title I was first enacted in 1965 as part of a
series of measures designed to tackle poverty. Understanding the rela-
tionship between different layers of government funding for education
isdifficultgiventhatrevenuescomefromlocal,state,andfederalgovern-
ments. A change in federal government funding, thus, can affect the
revenues collected at both the local and state government levels.
Gordon (2004) also is concerned with the endogeneity of the federal
program. The Title I funds are allocated under a formula that includes
state‐level education spending. This and other complexities of the for-
mula provide a credible argument for treating the federal funding as
endogenous. Gordon relies on a discontinuity in the formula to identify
the federal funding. The formula relies on decennial census data to iden-
tifypoverty levelsintheUnitedStates. Thisreliancecreatesadiscontinu-
ity between the reported and actual poverty levels. This is especially
prominent around the time when census data are released. Upon the
release of census data, the poverty measures used in the formula are
updated. If there have been dramatic changes in poverty rates from
one census to the next, the distribution of grants across the states also
changes dramatically. Gordon uses this change in funding as an instru-
ment for the federal funding a school district receives under Title I.
Gordon (2004) studies the effect of federal funding on both local and
state educational funding. In the first year of a change in funding, there
is no measurable effect on local funding. There is, however, a significant
amount of crowd‐out in the second and third years of funding. On
average, she finds a crowd‐out that is close to a dollar for every dollar
received in federal funding.
The effects of a change in federal funding on state education funding
are less clear. Over time Gordon observes a high degree of crowd‐out be-
tween federal funding and state formula aid funding to a school district.
There is no measurable crowd‐out of state categorical aid. Moreover, the
Payne 168crowd‐out of state funding is observed only if the state gains Title I
funding. There is less evidence of crowd‐out in states that lose Title I
funding.
C. Do Government Grants for Charitable Goods Crowd Out
Private Donations?
Researchers have been trying to measure the effect of a change in gov-
ernment funding for privately provided charitable services on private
donations since the late 1970s. The theoretically expected change in pri-
vate donations from an increase in government funding depends in
part on the underlying motivation for the private donation. Andreoni
(2006) illustrates that if individuals are solely altruistic in their giving,
care only about the provision of the good, and are indifferent between
giving directly and giving indirectly by being taxed, we should expect
that an increase in government funding (via taxation) results in a de-
crease in private donations, dollar for dollar. This result holds even if
some taxpayers do not donate provided that the number of potential
donors in thepopulation islarge (see,e.g.,Bergstrom,Blume, and Varian
1986; Andreoni 1988). If, however, individuals are more than altruistic
and receive a private benefit from giving (“warm glow”), government
fundingcrowdsoutindividualcontributions butataratethatislessthan
dollar for dollar (see Andreoni 1990, 2006).
A key data issue is finding a data set that permits a suitable match be-
tween private and public funding.
3 Most researchers have resorted to
usingdataaggregatedatthecharitylevel.Abenefittousingcharity‐level
data is that the researcher can observe private and public funding re-
ceivedbythecharityandapaneldataanalysiscanbeused.IntheUnited
States, researchers have used charity tax returns, data on international
relief organizations, and data on postsecondary institutions from sur-
veyscollectedbythegovernment.EarlystudiesusingU.S.datawerelim-
ited to a random sample of charity tax return data. Starting in 1998,
machine‐readable data for all charities that file tax returns and whose
revenues exceed a minimum threshold became available to researchers.
Withcharity‐leveldata,researcherscancontrolforheterogeneityinthe
provision of the charitable goods because of differences in such things as
the organizational structure of the charities, the type of good or service
being provided, and the reputation of the organization. Researchers can
alsosegregatetheiranalysisonthebasisofthetypeofcharitablegoodsor
services being provided. This aspect is important given that the moti-
v a t i o n sf o rg i v i n gm a yd i f f e ro nt h eb a s i so ft h et y p eo fg o o db e i n g
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gifts to poverty‐related organizations than for artistic or education‐
related organizations.
A downside to using charity‐level data is that one cannot study the
crowd‐out effect on individual donors. Instead the relationship repre-
sents the average effect across all donors and donor types. A second
downside tousing databasedon thecharity’srevenues isthat we cannot
observe the entire reaction by a donor to a change in government fund-
ing. If, for instance, government grants to charities increase and private
donations to that charity decrease, do the donors to this charity stop giv-
ing or do they just stop giving to that particular charity? If these donors
continue to give, do they give to charities that are providing a type of
goodsimilartothatoftheinitialcharity?Athirddownsidetousingchar-
ity revenue data is that the quality of the data depends on the attention
given to filling outthe formsthat reflect the charity’srevenueandexpen-
ditures. In most instances, these data come from the tax returns filed by
the charities with the federal government. Given that charities pay no
taxes, the likelihood that a given charity is audited by the government
is lower than for taxpaying organizations. In addition, many charities
are run by volunteers, and so the quality of the information reported
on the tax return is likely to be quite noisy.
The key empirical issues are endogeneity and omitted‐variable bias.
Payne (1998) raises this issue in the context in which the government of-
ficialsawardingthegrantstocharitiesareelectedbytheindividualswho
donate. Payne (1998), Hungerman (2005), Gruber and Hungerman
(2007), and Dokko (2009) address this endogeneity issue. The first three
papers address endogeneity by using a 2SLS specification. Payne and
Hungerman explore the effects of changes in social welfare funding for
social service organizations and religious organizations, respectively.
Payne uses data that match government grants and private donations
to a group of more than 400 charities. She controls for endogeneity by
using instruments that identify government spending levels for sim-
ilar types of services within the area in which the charity is located.
Hungerman uses data that match contributions to a set of more than
9,000 Presbyterian churches to per capita government welfare spending
in the area in which the church is located. His instrument is based on the
1996welfarereform,whichaffectednoncitizensdifferentlyfromcitizens.
Both of these papers suggest that crowd‐out is in the 40¢–70¢ range. This
estimate has been recently confirmed in Andreoni and Payne (2009)
u s i n gad a t as e tt h a th a sm o r er e c e nt data that cover a greater set of
organizations and a specification with stronger instruments.
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of the Depression’s New Deal spending on church contributions at ap-
proximately 50,000 churches from different denominations. Their instru-
ment is based on the strength of the congressional delegation in the area
in which the church is located. Their measure of crowd‐out, however, is
quotelow,suggestingthatforeverydollarofNewDealspending,church
spending per capita declines by only 5.7¢ per church member. An issue
with church spending, however, is that church spending on activities
that are comparable to the New Deal spending is relatively small when
compared to the amount of government spending under the New Deal
programs.
Dokko (2009) exploits a natural experiment resulting from the change
in political leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives in the 1994
election to explore the effects of a dramatic decline in the allocation of
funding to the National Endowment of the Arts. She compares the grant
allocations and private donations made to arts organizations in 1995 to
those made in 1996. She measures a crowd‐out of approximately 60¢ per
dollar.
4
D. Does Government Support Crowd Out Private Goods and Services?
The final type of crowd‐out estimation covered in this paper is the
crowd‐out associated with the government support of goods supplied
toindividuals.Ifocusontheliteraturethathassoughttounderstandbet-
ter the effectsof providing publicly funded healthinsurance coverage on
t h eu s eo fp r i v a t eh e a l t hi n s u r a n c e .T h i st y p eo fc r o w d ‐out, however,
might be observed when thinking about public provision or subsidiza-
tion of education, public support of housing and households, or the gov-
ernment subsidization of research and innovation.
Peltzman (1973) provides a framework for thinking about this issue.
Theunderlyingassumptionisthatindividualshavedifferentpreferences
toward health insurance coverage, subject to a budget constraint. This
results in high and low demanders for insurance. If the government in-
troduces public insurance programs, we should expect some individuals
to switch from private to public insurance coverage. The story, however,
is not this simple. Public insurance, historically,is not aperfect substitute
for private insurance. The types and level of services covered tend to be
lower, and often there is a stigma associated with public insurance pro-
grams targeted to low‐income families. In addition, most private insur-
ance is provided through one’s workplace. Cutler and Gruber (1996)
demonstratethatevenwiththesewrinkles,weshouldexpectareduction
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insurance coverage.
Cutler and Gruber examine the effect of expanded public health in-
surance in the 1990s on the crowd‐out of private insurance. Their iden-
tification strategy is to use data on children and women to estimate the
effect of own public insurance eligibility on own insurance coverage,
after controlling for individual characteristics and state and year effects.
Recognizing that public insurance eligibility is endogenous, they use a
2SLS strategy instrumenting public insurance eligibility with measures
that reflect the legislative environment in the state and year in which
the individuals under study live. They identify a significant amount
of crowd‐out of private insurance.
Card and Shore‐Sheppard (2004) adopt a different identification strat-
egy, use different data, and measure a smaller crowd‐out effect. These
resultsareattributed totwokeythings.First,they exploit adiscontinuity
in a feature of the changes in the public health insurance program. They
examine two changes to the program. In the first change, the program
was expanded to cover pregnant women and children up to the age of
6 whose family incomes fell below 133% of the federal poverty level. The
second expansion extended coverage to children born after September
30, 1983, to families whose incomes fell below 100% of the federal pov-
erty line. Each of these changes resulted in the ability to identify groups
that were on either side of the cutoff allocation. This strategy allows one
to use the group that did not qualify for the program as a control group
and the group that just qualifies for the program as a treatment group.
Through the identification of treatment and control groups, Card and
Shore‐Sheppard are able to identify whether the public insurance pro-
gram crowds out private insurance.
5
Card and Shore‐Sheppard’s analysis suggests that the take‐up rate
of the public insurance programs after the policy changes was low,
and this resulted in little crowd‐out between public and private in-
surance programs. They replicate the earlier work by Cutler and
Gruber (1996) and demonstrate that the earlier results are sensitive
to whether the estimation specification includes/excludes age and
income measures.
Gruber and Simon (2007) have continued the exploration of whether
public insurance programs crowd out private insurance programs. They
consider further the empirical estimation and whether income should be
treated as an endogenous measure insofar as the distribution of children
into the treatment and control groups is a function of family income. By
consideringmorecarefullytheroleplayedbyincome,GruberandSimon
Payne 172provide evidence that crowd‐out exists and is quite strong, ranging from
47% to 92% of federal funding.
III. ImportanceofInstitutional Details WhenEstimating Crowd‐Out
The last section discussed the importance of considering statistical is-
sues when estimating crowd‐out. This section discusses the importance
of considering the context under which the federal funding is being
provided. Across the three contexts, the theoretical frameworks are gen-
erally straightforward. Most start with some aspect of individual be-
havior and an aspect of the good or service that suggests that, if there
were no government support of the good, it would be underprovided.
For example, if built solely with state funding, interstate highways will
cater to the needs of the voters of that state. The state is likely to ignore
the needs of users of the interstate system who reside outside of the
state. While the theoretical framework is sufficient to capture the es-
sence of why we would expect a crowd‐out effect, it may not capture
other constraints or features of the funding or the delivery of the goods
and services to explain why we might not measure crowd‐out. Alterna-
tively, if crowd‐out is measured, how can it be counteracted? Are there
policies that can be implemented that encourage an efficient level of
good or service provision? For the three areas of research, I highlight
the issues that could affect the measurement or the interpretation of
crowd‐out.
A. Constraints Placed on State and Local Governments
A recent paper by Brooks and Phillips (2008) studies the effects of the
federal government’s Community Development Block Grant (CDBG),
thefederalgovernment’slargestprogramprovidingaidtocities,onlocal
government responses. The CDBG is distributed to local governments
via a formula. Unlike Knight (2002), Brooks and Phillips argue that the
formula used to distribute the federal funding is exogenous since it is
based on a given city’s need relative to all other cities, limiting the ability
of the federal government to direct funding to a given city for political
reasons.
Brooks and Phillips (2008) suggest that there is a flypaper effect from
the government program. A key insight of this study is a careful consid-
eration of what drives the flypaper effect. The theory assumes that local
governments maximize voter preferences given budget constraints. Lo-
cal governments are also assumed to have no additional constraints on
Does Government Funding Change Behavior? 173the extent to which they tax their citizens. In recent decades, however,
state governments and/or state referenda have imposed tax and spend-
ing limits on some city governments. These limits restrict a city govern-
ment’s ability to raise an efficient level of revenue to cover the costs
of their programs. Brooks and Phillips show that part of the observed
flypaper effect is due to these limitations. Thus, in these instances, local
governments may use the federal funding as a supplement that en-
ables them to provide a level of goods or services that meets their voter
preferences.
B. The Source of Crowd‐Out for Charitable Goods
The bulk of the theory on the crowd‐out of charitable giving ignores that
most charitable goods and services are delivered by an organization.
Most of the theoretical literature on this issue also does not address the
fact that many individuals are latent donors and give only when asked
to give. As a result, most charities must engage in fund‐raising efforts.
Andreoni and Payne (2003, 2009) tackle this issue to explore the extent
to which charities change their behavior toward fund‐raising when they
receive government funding and how this affects the measurement
of crowd‐out. If charities are more concerned with service provision
than revenue growth, they may not be net revenue maximizers. Instead,
charities may view fund‐raising as a necessary evil and fund‐raise
only if it is needed. Receiving a government grant could reduce fund‐
raising efforts, resulting in a decline in donations that is more attrib-
utabletoachangeincharitybehaviorthanachangeinindividualdonor
behavior.
Adding the component of fund‐raising complicates the estimation of
crowd‐out even further. One wants to measure the effect of a change in
government grants and a change in fund‐raising behavior on private
donations. Fund‐raising behavior, however, also depends on govern-
ment grants, and we remain concerned about the endogeneity of the
government funding measure. Andreoni and Payne (2009) illustrate
one method to address the estimation issue using a 2SLS framework.
On the basis of a panel of more than 8,000 organizations that provide
support social services, their results suggest that government funding
crowds out private donations by approximately 72¢. The crowd‐out at-
tributable to changes in private donor behavior ranges from 30% to a
slight crowd‐in, and the remainder is attributable to a decrease in fund‐
raising effort by the charity. Thus, the bulk of crowd‐out can be attrib-
utable to actions taken by charities, suggesting that government policy
Payne 174taken to counteract crowd‐out may want to consider the role played by
charities in their solicitation of private funding.
Another consideration is whether the role of government funding is
just as a funding source. The discussion to this point assumes that indi-
viduals are fully informed prior to making their decision. In some con-
texts, individuals may not have the expertise to be fully informed. For
example, with respect to funding for scientific research, a private donor
may not have sufficient information to assess the quality of the research.
Most government funding for research is allocated on the basis of a peer‐
reviewed assessment, ensuring that the funding is allocated to the best
projects. Private donors, thus, may look to the government funding of
research as a signal of quality. If this is the case, we should expect private
donations to increase with an increase in government funding. Payne
(2001) illustrates these points and finds a positive crowd‐in effect from
government research funding on private donations at research‐intensive
universities and a crowd‐out effect on less research‐intensive post-
secondary institutions.
A third aspect of crowd‐out is to consider the sociodemographics of
the private donors. Can the profile of a community from an age, income,
or racial perspective affect the measurement of crowd‐out? Hungerman
(2007) illustrates this point. He uses data from a panel of Methodist
churches between 1984 and 2000 to study the effects of the post‐1991 ex-
pansion of the supplemental Social Security program on church spend-
ing. His source of exogenous variation in the government funding is the
1991SupremeCourtrulingrequiringtheprogramtoexpanditscoverage
to include children. While he observes crowd‐out in communities that
are relatively homogeneous, he presents evidence of minimal crowd‐
out in the more heterogeneous communities.
C. Is Public Health Insurance the Same as Private Health Insurance?
Gruber and Simon (2007) illustrate a high level of crowd‐out between
public and private insurance. Gruber and Simon (2007) and Shore‐
Sheppard (2008), however, document an aspect of the public health in-
suranceprogramthataffectsthemeasurementofcrowd‐out.Bothpapers
highlightthefactthatthetake‐uprateofthepublicinsuranceprogramsis
relatively low. Gruber and Simon show that the take‐up rate is relatively
low, especially in cases in which children were previously covered by a
privateinsuranceprogram.Inpartthisisattributabletogovernmentpro-
cedures designed to counteract crowd‐out. Gruber and Simon further
demonstrate that the low take‐up rate is due to a consideration of family
Does Government Funding Change Behavior? 175coverage. If a child is eligible for public coverage but not the parent, a
working parent who receives coverage through her employer is less
likely to switch fromthe private tothe public insurance programs.When
family eligibility is considered, Gruber and Simon find greater evidence
of switching to public insurance coverage in families in which most
members are eligible for the public insurance coverage.
The low take‐up rate raises another question, namely, what is different
about the public and private insurance systems that makes the two sys-
tems to not be considered as substitutes? Unlike the other two areas of
crowd‐out examined in this paper, the public insurance system repre-
sents a service that is delivered by the government. The other examples
study a role played by the government as financial supporter. Thus, in
considering the issue of crowd‐out, one should consider the mechanism
of support by the government. When the good that is supported by the
government is of a different (especially lesser) quality than the good that
is provided privately, crowd‐out of the private good may be welfare re-
ducing. Brown and Finkelstein (2008) illustrate that individuals switch
from private to public insurance programs despite there being a lower
level of health benefits under the public insurance program.
IV. Discussion and Conclusion
Across the three strands of research covered in this paper, there is a
plethora of research that would suggest that the theoretical prediction
of crowd‐out is not justified empirically. As illustrated in table 1, how-
ever, a smaller subset of the research in these areas suggests that crowd‐
out exists. Many things distinguish this latter research from the former.
This paper illustrates the key features of quality empirical analyses. It
also provides some caveats. A good empirical analysis considers gen-
eral issues concerning data quality and the ability to match data on
government behavior with the dependent variable. It also carefully
considers the empirical estimation and explores the potential endo-
geneity of government funding as well as omitted‐variable bias. Fi-
nally, it considers the strengths and weaknesses of the approach taken
to address the statistical issues.
Across the papers discussed there were several methods used to ad-
dress the issue of endogenous government funding and/or omitted‐
variable analysis. The most common approach is to identify a set of
measuresthat predict government funding but have no direct prediction
of the dependent variable under study. Knight (2002) and Andreoni and













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































179membership as effective instruments. Other researchers such as Card
and Shore‐Sheppard (2004) and Gordon (2004) have used discrete
changes in the formulas to develop a set of simulated predictions of
the government funding that are used as instruments. An alternative
to2SLSistoidentifyanaturalexperimentsuchastheoneusedbyDokko
(2009), which used the change in the majority party in Congress to ex-
plore how changes in government funding affected private donations
to arts organizations.
An equally important issue is to consider the institutional setting un-
der which the government funding is provided. The research has high-
lighted many examples in which the nature of crowd‐out is affected by
the institutional detail. With respect to the provision of public health
insurance, several researchers have highlighted the concern of a low
take‐up rate. This low take‐up rate can affect whether one measures a
crowd‐out effect. With respect to federal block grants, we should be
concerned with whether the state or local government receiving the
grant is operating under a fiscal constraint that prevents it from provid-
ing the locally optimal level of goods or services. As illustrated in
Brooks and Phillips (2008), cities that were subject to tax and spending
limits were less likely than those not subject to tax and spending limits
to engage in crowd‐out behavior from the receipt of federal block grant
funding. The studies on charitable giving illustrate the importance of
considering the mechanisms under which the good is provided and is-
sues concerning community diversity. As illustrated in Andreoni and
Payne (2009), if charities are not profit maximizers and if individ-
uals give only if asked to give, increased government funding may
crowd out private donations because of a change in the behavior of
the charity.
Finally, the mechanism of support should be considered. In most of
the examples discussed in this paper, financial support is given. Direct
government provision, as in public health insurance coverage, is also a
possibility. Crowd‐out and other inefficiencies can be exacerbated if the
government‐provided good is not similar to the privately provided
good.
Why is it important to understand these empirical and institutional
issues? Government provision is predicated on an observed under-
provision of the good if left solely in the hands of the private market
(or local government). In addition, the government funding used to sup-
port these goods and services is often raised under a distortionary tax
system. Depending on the level of crowd‐out, if it is found to exist, gov-
ernment support may create more waste than help.
Payne 180To ensure that government funding increases the level of the goods it
is supporting, policy makers must consider how best to combat crowd‐
out. At the same time, as illustrated in the concern about low take‐up
rates for public insurance programs, policy makers must ensure that
theireffortstocounteractcrowd‐outdonotresultinnegativeunintended
consequences.
What is lacking in the research is a better understanding of what
measures help to combat crowd‐out. Matching grants are often sug-
gested as a means to combat crowd‐out. Brueckner (2000), for example,
discusses the importance of matching grants as they relate to welfare
reform. Brueckner discusses the 1996 changes to the federal programs
for supporting state government spending on welfare programs. These
changes included a switch from a matching grant to a block grant for-
mula for distributing federal funding to state governments. While block
grants give states more latitude in how to use the funding, they also
provide the states with an opportunity to redirect their spending on
welfare programs to other types of programs or to provide a tax reduc-
tion to its residents. As Brueckner points out, there are other considera-
tions that should be taken into account when considering whether to
use a matching or block grant method of allocation. These things in-
clude the administrative complexities of a matching grant program
and a consideration of satisfying taxpayers’ interests.
Another potential means to combat crowd‐out is for the government
to consider more carefully its role in providing full funding for a good
or service through the direct production of the good or service or in the
financing of the production costs. In the last few decades there has been
an interest in downsizing government and in finding private alterna-
tives to support all or part of previously publicly provided goods
and services. There is limited research on understanding whether trans-
ferring part of the government support to private organizations results
in any type of crowd‐out behavior.
In summary, this paper illustrates that crowd‐out exists—at least
sometimes. Empirical estimation of crowd‐out is complicated, and there
are many institutional features and other considerations that affect
whether there is crowd‐o u to fag i v e ng o v e r n m e n tp r o g r a m .W h e n
enacting new programs and modifying existing programs, policy
makers should consider the potential for crowd‐out. In addition, more
research is needed to understand which types of policies best combat
crowd‐out.
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1. In some cases, theory predicts “crowd‐in,” which results in an increase in private
funding when government funding is increased. Payne (2001) illustrates this in the con-




public transfers on private transfers to households in South Africa.
3. See Brown and Lankford (1992), Day and Devlin (1996), and Simmons and
Emanuele (2004) for analyses that focus on the effect of government funding on volunteer
donor time.
4. Dokko relies on a data set that reports only total private and public donations and so
must back out the amount of the donations that are attributable to government funding.
Thus, her measure of private donations will be noisy if she has not properly attributed the
funding across private and government funding channels.
5. This identification strategy, however, estimates a “local effect” insofar as it is cen-
tered around the discontinuity and compares those individuals who barely qualify for
public insurance and those who barely do not qualify for public insurance.
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